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Price discrimination is a practice ￿rms often use to extract the consumer sur-
plus from high value customers. Though its e⁄ect on the total welfare can
be either positive or negative, it usually bene￿ts the producers at the cost of
the consumers. Economists have long been interested in this phenomenon (e.g.
chapter 3 of Tirole 1988, Stole 2007). One of the main issues in this literature
is the relationship between the market structure and the ability of the ￿rms to
practice price discrimination. The conventional wisdom is that a competitive
￿rm cannot price discriminate because it is a price taker and a ￿rm with market
power can price discriminate as long as it can segment the consumers. Hence, as
the market becomes more competitive, there should be less price discrimination.
However, studies by Katz (1984), Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989) and Dana
(1998) show price discrimination can exist in pretty competitive markets. And
more recently, Liu and Serfes (2006) show that the relationship between market
competition and the degree of price discrimination is nonlinear using a second-
degree price discrimination model and McAfee, Mialon and Mialon (2006) show
that the same relationship can be either positive or negative using a third-degree
price discrimination model. Therefore, since theoretical studies do not produce
a clear prediction, the relationship between the market structure and the degree
of price discrimination becomes an empirical question.
In previous study, I found that part of the price premium enjoyed by the
healthy ketchup products over conventional ketchup products can be attributed
to the price discrimination practice. In this study, I continue this line of research
by examining the relationship between market structure and price di⁄erences
between the healthy and conventional ketchup products. Studies in this liter-
ature have examined the same issue for other industries. Busse and Rysman
(2005) ￿nd that more competition leads to less price discrimination in the yellow
page advertising market. Clerides and Michis (2006) study the detergent mar-
ket in six countries and ￿nd the relationship is positive in some countries, while
negative in others. Stavins (2001) and Hernandez and Wiggins (2008) report
the relationship being negative using data from the U.S. airline industry. This
study o⁄ers another piece of empirical evidence on this important theoretical
relationship.
12 Industry characteristics
Ketchup is a widely used condiment in U.S., found in 97% of all kitchens, a
showing matched only by salt, pepper, and sugar.1 It is mainly consumed
with hot dogs, French fries, hamburgers, pasta and serves as seasoning to make
sauces such as salsa and other food. The total annual market sale in 2006 is
approximately 5.88 billion U.S. dollars.2 Heinz is the leading ￿rm whose market
share remains stable around 60% in volume in 2006 in ketchup market. Hunt￿ s,
a ConAgra Foods brand is the second largest, sharing about 16% of the market.
The rest of the market is shared by private label products, Del monte and other
local brands.
The business section of annual reports of Heinz and ConAgra Foods pro-
vide a description of the ketchup business ranging from procurement to retailing.
Ketchup is made starting from developing the recipes originated from individual
company￿ s research laboratories and experimental kitchens. Ingredients are in-
spected and transported to factories. To hedge the spot market price volatility,
major ketchup producers usually sign future contracts with farmers growing raw
materials such as tomatoes, cucumbers and onions. Ingredients such as sugar
and sweeteners (high fructose corn syrup, a major sugar substitute in most of
Heinz and Hunt￿ s products) are purchased from approved suppliers. In the fac-
tory, raw materials are manufactured into ketchup product after prepared by
sterilization, homogenization, chilling, freezing, pickling, drying, freeze drying,
baking or extruding, bottling and labeling. Products are sold through their own
sales organizations and through independent brokers, agents and distributors to
chain, wholesale and other retailers. Besides, according to annual report, Wal-
Mart is the number one customer of Heinz and ConAgra Foods, representing
approximately 11% and 18% of the ￿rm￿ s total sales respectively in 2010.
3 Data
The data in this paper is constructed based on IRI scanner dataset. The cen-
terpieces of the data are prices and measures of competition. The IRI scanner
1Quote from J. Miguel Villas-Boas and Ying Zhao (2005): "Retailer, Manufacturers, and
Individual Consumers: Modeling the Supply Side in the Ketchup Marketplace," Journal of
Marketing Research, 42,83,95
2This ￿gure is calculated by 60% market share and the total revenue of Heinz in ketchup
and sauce category in its 2006 annual report.
2dataset is cross-sectional dataset including transaction units and dollars of each
UPC in each week and store from ￿rst day of 2001 to last day of 2006. The
stores are randomly sampled from 50 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas. The
raw dataset also includes information of price reduction, product display and
degree of advertisement by retailer. This analysis includes observations in all
kinds of display levels. Manufactures pay retailers allowances to display their
products in outstanding places such aisle and lobby. Therefore, these prices
re￿ ect manufactures￿strategy. When the transaction price is 5% lower than
the original price, the observation is ignored, because it is not clear the price
reduction is due to retailer or manufactures￿pricing strategy. It is possible that
the 5% reduction is either due to use of manufacture￿ s coupon or retailer sales.
For advertisement, except those transactions with large advertisement such as
retailer coupon or rebate, I include them all. Besides, price re￿ ects the strategy
of manufactures but retailers.
The raw dataset is sorted into 1199 markets, where a market is de￿ned
as a combination of MSA and quarter. Since the de￿nitions of MSA from
CPS and region from IRI are very close, I substitute them in the analysis. In
each market, each observation is the weighted average price di⁄erence between
healthy and regular products for each vendor. Only vendors selling both healthy
and regular products are included. The weight average price is constructed
by averaging price from weekly store level to quarterly vendor level and then
weighted each UPC with in category. Besides, msa dummy, quarter dummy, and
vendor dummy are created to control the price variation.
To conduct the analysis, measure of competition is required. I construct
several of measure of competition, Her￿ndahl Hirschman Index (HHI), number
of vendors in each market and number of brands in each market. Furthermore,
HHI is constructed according to total vendor market share and vendor market
share in each market segmentation respectively.
Her￿ndahl Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of sizes of ￿rms in relation






where, simt is the market share of ￿rm i in the MSA m and quarter t. The














,where Nh is the number of vendors selling healthy products. HHI in regular
segmentation is calculated accordingly.
HHI ranges from 1=N to 1. When a HHI is smaller than 0.01, it indicates
a highly competitive market, a industry without dominant players. When HHI
is between 0.1 and 0.18, the market is moderate concentration and above 0.18
indicates high concentration.
4 Identi￿cation
Suppose there are two markets with di⁄erent competitive structure. Then, the
hypothesis above can be tested by examining the following relationship:
[(Pm(h) ￿ Cm(h)) ￿ (Pm(r) ￿ Cm(r))] Q [(P
d(h) ￿ Cd(h)) ￿ (Pd(r) ￿ Cd(r))]
(4)
where m indexes the market with less competition and d denotes the market
with more competition. Letter h index the healthy and r regular products,
respectively. In addition, price discrimination is de￿ned as di⁄erences in price-
cost margins. Again, since costs are not observed, assumptions need to be made
to proceed. Demand and supply structures are assumed to recover the costs.
The idea is essentially similar to that of a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator. I
assume that the cost di⁄erences for a ￿rm to supply healthy and regular products
to di⁄erent markets are the same, that is,
Cm(h) ￿ Cm(r) = Cd(h) ￿ Cd(r) (5)
where Cm(h) is the cost of healthy products in market with less competition
4and Cd(h) is the cost for healthy products in market with more competition.
This is a reasonable assumption as ketchup ￿rms produce both healthy and
regular products in the same plant. For distribution cost, I assume the di⁄er-
ence across markets is additive, then the di⁄erence of distribution cost between
healthy and regular products across market will be canceled out. Under this
assumption, the hypothesis reduces to :
Pm(h) ￿ Pm(r) Q P
d(h) ￿ Pd(r) (6)
In practice, I estimate the following regression,
[P(h) ￿ P(r)]imt= ￿0+￿1competitionmt+FirmDummyi+QuarterDummyi+MSADummyi+"imt
(7)
where [P(h) ￿ P(r)]imt is the weighted average price di⁄erence between
healthy and regular products produced by ￿rm in market and period . The
competition intensity will be approximated by either the number of competitors,
the number of brands or the HHI. The parameter of interest is ￿1. For (4) to
yield a consistent estimate for , another implicit assumption is that the relative
demand for healthy and regular ketchup products is constant across di⁄erent
markets. Otherwise, prices for healthy and regular ketchup products may re￿ ect
di⁄erences in relative demand rather than di⁄erences in competition intensity.
Additionally, the model considers the scenario that price discrimination is
de￿ned as price and marginal cost ratio, as there isn￿ t unique common de￿nition











I assume that the cost ratio for a ￿rm to supply healthy and regular products







Under the assumption that the cost di⁄erence across markets is multiplica-
tive, the cost ratio between healthy and regular products across market will be














P(r) imtis the weighted average price di⁄erence between healthy and
regular products produced by ￿rm in market and period .
5 Results
5.1 HHI
The regressions results using HHI as competition measure are divided into two
groups using price ratio and price di⁄erence as dependent variables respectively.
All results are attached at the end of the paper. Results 1-2 are from price
di⁄erence and 3-4 are results from price ratio. In each group, I regress price
ratio or price di⁄erence on total HHI and HHI in segmentation with all dummy
variables. I tested whether msa dummy provides a better ￿t of the model by
comparing the results with and without it. By comparing the R2, I didn￿ t ￿nd
msa dummy improve the ￿t of model obviously.
Both price ratio and price di⁄erence regressions have high R2about 0.75.
Total HHI is the HHI computed in the whole market including both healthy
and regular products, while healthy HHI means the HHI computed in healthy
product segmentation and regular HHI is the HHI computed in regular product
segmentation. Both coe¢ cients of total HHI in regressions of price di⁄erence
and price ratio are statistically insigni￿cant. However, in regressions including
healthy and regular HHI, coe¢ cients of healthy HHI are statistically signi￿cant
while regular HHI are not. According to results 2 and results 4, if healthy HHI
increases by 0.1, the price di⁄erence between healthy and regular products will
decrease by 0.1 cent per ounce and price ratio between healthy and regular
products will decrease 1 cent per ounce. This means when market is more con-
centrated, the price di⁄erence and ratio between healthy and regular products
will decrease in U.S. ketchup market. For a typical 24 oz product, price dif-
6ference will decrease 2.4 cents per bottle and price ratio will decrease 30 cents
per bottle if healthy HHI increase by 0.1. Therefore, the less competition in
a market, the lower the price di⁄erence and ratio between healthy and regular
ketchup products.
5.2 Other competition measure
This section reports the regression results using other competition measures,
the number of brands in each market and the number of vendor in each market.
Regression results in this section are also divided into two groups according to
di⁄erent dependent variables, price ratio and price di⁄erence. In each group,
dependent variable is regressed on individual competition measure and the com-
bination of them. All regressions return a R2about 0.75.
In results 5 and 6, one less brand or vendor in the market will make price
di⁄erence decrease by 0.05 cent per ounce and 0.07 cent per ounce. Between
number of brand and number of vendor, the vendor number plays a more im-
portant role in determining the price di⁄erence by reading the results 7. If both
measures are included in the regression, the number of brands is statistically
insigni￿cant.
In results 8 and 9, one less brand or vendor in the market reduce price ratio
by 0.8 cent per ounce and 1.0 cent per ounce. Both measure coe¢ cients are
statistically insigni￿cant in result 10. These implications above are consistent
from results using HHI as competition measure. In more concentrated market,
both price di⁄erence and price ratio are smaller in U.S. ketchup industry.
6 Conclusion and Future work
This article studies the relationship between market structure and price dis-
crimination in U.S. ketchup industry. By assuming supply cost change is either
additive constant or multiplicative constant and the demand side is constant,
the analysis examines the price di⁄erence and ratio change in 1199 U.S. market
and various vendors selling both healthy and regular ketchup products. Em-
pirical results indicate that market concentration and price discrimination has
negative relationship, which means the less competitive in the industry, the
less price discrimination. Price discrimination is de￿ned as both price cost ra-
tio and price cost di⁄erence. Results from both de￿nitions are consistent with
each other and results using various competition measures are also consistent
7with the conclusion above. This analysis is on MSA quarter and vendor level.
The examination of results based on a MSA, quarter and brand level analysis
and MSA, month and vendor level are remained as future work. The market
competition is measured by HHI on brand level rather than vendor level.
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107 Tabels:
Table 1 Regression of Price di⁄erence on total HHI
Result 1 Result 2
total HHI Individual HHI
Price di⁄erence Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
Total HHI -0.0008393 ￿
t-stat -0.07 ￿
Healthy HHI ￿ -0.0100376
t-stat ￿ -3.69
Regular HHI ￿ -0.0048826
t-stat ￿ -0.42
R2 0.7865 0.7878
Note: All regressions include quarter, MSA and vendor dummy variables.
Table 2 Regression of Price ratio on total HHI
Result 3 Result 4
total HHI Individual HHI
Price Ratio Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
Total HHI -0.1512 ￿
t-stat -0.98 ￿
Healthy HHI ￿ -0.0998
t-stat ￿ -2.86
Regular HHI ￿ -0.2159
t-stat ￿ -1.43
R2 0.7546 0.7557
Table 3 Regression of Price Di⁄erence on other Competition
Measure
Result 5 Result 6 Result 7
Price di⁄erence Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
# of brands 0.0004903 ￿ -0.0006033
t-stat 2.18 ￿ -1.06
# of vendors ￿ 0.0007164 0.0013415
t-stat ￿ 2.83 2.09
R2 0.7869 0.7872 0.7873
11Table 4 Regression of Price Di⁄erence on other Competition
Measure
Result 8 Result 9 Result 10
Price di⁄erence Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
# of brands 0.007666 ￿ -0.001573
t-stat 2.67 ￿ -0.22
# of vendors ￿ 0.009703 0.01133
t-stat ￿ 2.99 1.38
R2 0.7553 0.7555 0.7555
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